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161 
CODIFYING COMMONSENSE: RELIGIOUS VIEWPOINT 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACTS AND THE FREE SPEECH 
RIGHTS THEY PROTECT 
The Supreme Court has held that a student’s right to free 
speech warrants protection and, thus, is not shed at the 
schoolhouse doors. Students whose religious viewpoints are 
discriminated against at school are likely unaware of their 
constitutional rights. The Religious Viewpoints 
Antidiscrimination Act or Student Religious Liberties Act—
passed in Tennessee, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas—
aims to protect students’ right to free speech. The Acts reaffirm 
constitutionally protected rights to free speech in classroom 
assignments, homework, and other interactions while at school. 
The Acts also advocate for the establishment of a limited 
public forum at all school-sponsored events where students may 
speak. This policy ensures both that students can speak at any 
school-sponsored event without fear of discrimination and that 
schools do not run afoul of the Establishment Clause’s 
proscriptions. The Acts pass scrutiny under both the Lemon test 
and the endorsement test and are, therefore, constitutionally 
sound. The Acts promote a policy that protects students’ free 
speech rights, including the right of religious expression, and 
provide teachers and administrators with a clear policy that 
will prevent costly litigation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When a fifth-grader in Tennessee was told by her teacher to 
write about whomever the student admired most, she was told 
that she could not write about God. In Texas, a group of 
cheerleaders were banned from holding banners mentioning 
Christ at a football game. A South Carolina Valedictorian 
offered the Lord’s Prayer during graduation despite a recent 
ban on the use of prayer at high school graduations. A Texas 
Valedictorian decided to attribute his success to Christ while 
speaking at graduation and quickly had his microphone turned 
off by school officials. All of these stories reveal a problem with 
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student religious expression in public schools. The problem 
most typically arises when a student speaks about religion in 
school; because of its perceived influence or impact on other 
students, the student is silenced.  While it would be unwise to 
label, at least in all cases, this censorship the result of hate or 
maliciousness, it is rooted in a misunderstanding and 
misapplication of the United States Constitution. Teachers and 
school officials are not properly instructed on students’ free 
speech rights and, therefore, choose to err in favor of no 
expression in order to avoid violating the Establishment 
Clause. 
In an effort to protect students’ free speech rights, 
legislation was passed in Texas, Mississippi, South Carolina, 
and most recently Tennessee. The legislation is known as the 
Student Religious Liberties Act (“SRLA”) or Religious 
Viewpoint Anti-discrimination Act (“RVAA”) [hereinafter “the 
Act(s)” or “the Antidiscrimination Act(s)”]. The 
Antidiscrimination Acts provide guidance on student speech in 
schools and especially in school-sponsored events such as 
graduation, pep rallies, assemblies, and sporting events. The 
Acts reinforce teachers’ and administrators’ understanding of 
students’ freedom of speech rights in classwork, homework, 
private conversation, and particularly in school-sponsored 
events where students may speak. 
The Antidiscrimination Acts call for the creation of limited 
public forums for all school-sponsored events. These forums are 
the key to understanding how students can express themselves 
at school-sponsored activities without violating the 
Establishment Clause. The Acts, in many aspects, were drafted 
with recent Supreme Court decisions on school-sponsored 
prayer and other related issues in mind. This is evidenced in at 
least three major ways. First, the Antidiscrimination Acts do 
not have a religious purpose or effect, do not inhibit or advance 
religion, and do not cause entanglement between the 
government and students. Next, the Acts do not endorse 
religion; they merely seek to protect students’ viewpoint 
expressions and facilitate the expressions regardless of 
whether they are religious or irreligious. Finally, when a 
student speaks at a school-sponsored event, the Acts do not 
encourage or facilitate coercion. While critics argue that the 
Acts might erode the constitutionally mandated separation of 
church and state, the Acts provide much needed protection of 
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free speech rights and policy direction. 
This Comment advances a commonsense argument that 
will discuss the Acts and the relevant Supreme Court cases. 
These discussions include free speech and Establishment 
Clause cases (Part I); why the Antidiscrimination Acts are 
needed to protect the freedom of speech in schools (Part II); 
how the Acts avoid violating the Establishment Clause (Part 
III); and, lastly, policy suggestions on application of the Acts 
(Part IV). 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Problem of Viewpoint Discrimination in Schools 
Students’ free speech rights, particularly students’ rights to 
religious speech and expression, are violated regularly while at 
school. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
contains two important clauses, known commonly as the 
Establishment and Free Speech Clauses.1 Respectively, these 
clauses state that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion” and “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”2 While these rights should be 
afforded to all citizens, enforcing the proscriptions of the 
Establishment Clause has increasingly been given greater 
priority, especially in public schools.3 The following two 
examples serve as illustrations of violations of students’ rights 
to free speech under a misguided application of the 
Establishment Clause. 
In East Texas, Kountze Independent School District 
officials ordered that high school cheerleaders stop displaying 
banners containing religious messages and bible verses.4 The 
school administrator claimed that the messages violated the 
Establishment Clause.5 Parents soon filed suit complaining of 
free speech and free exercise violations.6 The suit recently 
 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Fear of Establishment Clause violations have left administrators and teachers 
without a practical understanding of the extent to which that right and the Free 
Exercise right interact. 
 4 Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews, No. 09-13-00251-CV, 2014 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 4951, at *3–5 (Tex. App. Beaumont May 8, 2014). 
 5 Id. at *5.  
 6 Id.  
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made it to the Court of Appeals of Texas, where the Court 
simply deemed the case moot because the litigated issues had 
been resolved.7 The Court found that the school district had 
changed its policy to the following: “Based on the evidence, 
including oral and written testimony, submitted to the Board, 
the Board concludes that school personnel are not required to 
prohibit messages on school banners, including run-through 
banners, that display fleeting expressions of community 
sentiment solely because the source or origin of such messages 
is religious.”8 
The court concluded its opinion, noting that the school 
district had made the necessary changes to the policy so that 
the cheerleaders could utilize religious speech on the banners.9 
The school changed the policy about seven months after the 
complaint was filed.10 
Another case, Rusk v. Crestview Local School District, arose 
in response to a school’s practice of distributing flyers to 
students through mailboxes.11 Claiming it violated the 
Establishment Clause, a parent brought suit to challenge the 
practice of distributing flyers that made reference religious 
activities or that contained religious messages.12 The lower 
court concurred with the parent, finding that this practice 
violated the Establishment Clause and issuing a permanent 
injunction against the school.13 
On appeal, however, the court found that the policy did not 
offend the Establishment Clause and addressed the appellee’s 
contention that the school was endorsing religion.14 The court 
stated, “[N]o reasonable observer could conclude that by 
distributing the flyers at issue here, Crestview is endorsing 
religion.”15 The court also addressed the “‘heightened concerns’ 
about the impressionability of elementary school students” 
stemming from Supreme Court precedent.16 However, the court 
reasoned that “the [Supreme] Court has never ruled that a 
 
 7 Id. at *11–12.  
 8 Id. at *12.  
 9 Id. at *24.  
 10 Id. at *12.  
 11 379 F.3d 418, 419 (6th Cir. 2004).  
 12 Id.  
 13 Id.  
 14 Id. at 424.  
 15 379 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 2004).  
 16 Id. 
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school’s practice might amount to an impermissible 
endorsement of religion because of the impressionability of the 
school’s young students.”17 
These examples demonstrate schools’ inability to correctly 
construe and apply the prohibitions of the Establishment 
Clause. The ensuing result is costly litigation and violation of 
students’ rights to free speech. Had Antidiscrimination Acts 
and better policies been in place, the constitutional rights of 
religious expression for the above-mentioned students’ might 
never have been infringed and litigation might have been 
avoided. 
B. Statutory Provisions and Policy Assessment of the 
Antidiscrimination Acts 
The Antidiscrimination Acts have been adopted in at least 
four states: Texas (2007), South Carolina (2010), Mississippi 
(2013), and, most recently, Tennessee (2014).18 The Acts vary 
slightly from state to state, but carry the same broad 
antidiscrimination message.19 While the titles of the 
Antidiscrimination Acts specifically mention religious 
expressions, the spirit of the Acts encompasses all expressions, 
religious or secular. Though not necessarily presented in this 
particular order, there are four main provisions in each of the 
Acts, discussed below in turn.20 
1. Students’ right to free speech 
The first part of the Acts state, in pertinent part, that “[a] 
school district shall treat a student’s voluntary expression . . . 
in the same manner the district treats a student’s voluntary 
expression of a secular or other viewpoint on an otherwise 
permissible subject and may not discriminate against the 
 
 17 Id.  
 18 TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 25.151-.157 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1-435, 59-1-
441, 59-1-442 (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-12-3–12-15 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 
49-6-1801–05 (2014).  
 19 Tennessee’s RVAA includes “promotes illegal drug use” under the 
Establishment of a limited public forum section. Id. § 49-6-1803. Additionally, the 
states vary on whether the schools must or may adopt a policy that establishes a 
limited public forum. Texas and Mississippi require that schools adopt a policy that 
requires the establishment of a limited public forum at all events where students will 
speak. These two states also include a model policy as part of the statute. 
 20 See supra note 18. 
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student based on a religious viewpoint . . . .”21 The 
Representative that sponsored the Tennessee bill repeatedly 
referred to this as a way to “level the playing field.”22 In this 
way, the Acts are not meant to place a student’s religious 
speech above another’s secular speech, but rather both are 
afforded equal protection. 
2. Students’ right to free speech in assignments 
Next, the Antidiscrimination Acts protect students’ 
expressions in classwork and homework. The Acts state, 
“Students may express their written beliefs about religion in 
homework, artwork, and other written and oral assignments 
free from discrimination based on the religious content.”23 
Additionally, students’ “[h]omework and classroom 
assignments shall be judged by ordinary academic standards of 
substance and relevance and against other legitimate academic 
concerns . . . [and] [s]tudents may not be penalized or rewarded 
based on the religious content of [their] work.”24 In light of the 
anecdote related above (i.e., where, in an assignment to write 
about a person the student admired most, a fifth grader in 
Tennessee was forbidden from writing about God), this 
provision has more than proved its need.25 
3.  Students have the freedom to organize groups 
The third provision of the Antidiscrimination Acts states 
that “students in public schools may pray or engage in religious 
activities or expressions before, during and after the school day 
in the same manner and to the same extent that students may 
engage in nonreligious activities or expressions. It continues, 
“[s]tudents may organize prayer groups, religious clubs . . . or 
other religious gatherings before, during and after school to the 
same extent that students are permitted to organize other 
noncurricular student activities and groups.”26 Additionally, the 
 
 21 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.151 (2013). 
 22 H.B.1547, 108th Gen. Assembly (Tn. 2014), available at 
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/108/Bill/HB1547.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
 23 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1804 (2014). 
 24 Id.  
 25 Suzi Parker, Will Tennessee’s New Religious Viewpoints Legislation Protect 
Bullying in School?, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 28, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/tennessees-
religious-viewpoints-legislation-protect-bullying-school-010041312.html. 
 26 MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-12-7 (2014).  
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Acts allow for any religious group to advertise its events to the 
same extent as any secular group.27 
4. The establishment of limited public forums for school-
sponsored events 
The final part of the Acts deals with the establishment of a 
limited public forum whenever students are speaking publicly 
at school events.28 This provision protects both the school and 
the student. The school is protected because the policy should 
“eliminate any actual or perceived affirmative school 
sponsorship or attribution to the [school] of a student’s 
expression of a religious viewpoint.”29 The main concern under 
the Establishment Clause when a student expresses religious 
sentiments publicly is whether the school supported that 
expression in an official capacity. 
To protect both the students and the school, the school 
should: (1) establish a forum that does not discriminate against 
a student’s voluntary expression; (2) select student speakers 
using neutral criteria;30 (3) limit the subject matter so that 
obscene, vulgar, offensively lewd, indecent or promoting of 
illegal drug use is prohibited;31 and (4) read and sign a 
disclaimer that removes the school’s hand from the speech.32 
Both the Mississippi and Texas Legislatures codified a 
model policy with the Act.33 The model policy provides further 
details on the use of the limited public forum at both 
graduation events and non-graduation events.34 
5. Policy assessment and suggestions 
While the First Amendment right to free speech is well 
 
 27 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1805 (2014). 
 28 Id. at § 1803.  
 29 Id.  
 30 Both the Texas and Mississippi statutes include several examples of neutral 
criteria. See TEX EDUC. CODE §§ 25.151-.157 (2013); MISS CODE ANN. §§ 37-12-3 to -15 
(2014).  
 31 This specifically differs from statute to statute. Tennessee’s refers to drug use 
while the other three do not. Still, all the schools have the right and responsibility to 
make sure that students are not misusing the forum and can do so without 
discriminating against their religious viewpoints. 
 32 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1803 (2014); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-12-9 
(2014).  
 33 MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-12-9(5); see also TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.156 (2013).  
 34 Id.  
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established, the provisions of the Antidiscrimination Acts help 
school administrators and teachers promote rather than 
prevent those rights in public schools.35 Opponents to the Acts 
argue that an increase in litigation will result because schools 
will try to facilitate more religious speech.36 However, the 
passage of time has largely eroded and discredited this 
argument, since—in the months and years following the 
passage of the Acts—hardly any litigation has been brought on 
the Acts. In fact, since its passage in 2007, the courts have only 
mentioned the Act once.37 Moreover, since Texas originally 
enacted the Act, at least three other states have adopted 
similar Acts, further supporting the notion that additional 
litigation is not likely a concern. 
Another issue arises after the legislature enacts the law 
and schools must begin to apply the new policy. School 
districts, including administrators, teachers, and additional 
staff, will likely need training on the updated policies. 
Finally, to ensure that students’ rights are protected, every 
state that adopts the Acts should require—rather than merely 
suggest—the establishment of a limited public forum. Doing 
this will, as mentioned above, protect students and schools. 
C. Supreme Court Precedent 
The Supreme Court has not ruled or made any statements 
regarding the various state Antidiscrimination Acts. As a 
result, it is impossible to say—with certainty—how (or if) the 
Acts fit within recognized First Amendment jurisprudence. 
However, the Court’s past decisions as to Free Speech and the 
Establishment Clause provide insight into how the Acts could 
be validly put into practice. Therefore, this Comment will 
discuss and consider the results and analysis of the Court in 
the prominent Free Speech and Establishment Clause cases. 
1. Cases where free speech is protected and viewpoint 
 
 35 Symposium, The Texas Religious Viewpoints Antidiscrimination Act and the 
Establishment Clause, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 939, 1021 (2009). 
 36 Id.; see also Sarah Posner, Using Texas’ model, more states mull ‘religious 
viewpoints’ in schools law, ALJAZEERA (April 24, 2014), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/4/24/religion-expressionschools.html (“When 
the [RVAA] passed in 2007 [speaking about the Texas Statute] ‘we were certain it 
would lead to lawsuits rather than prevent them . . . .’”). 
 37 Symposium, supra note 35, at 1022; see also Does 1-7 v. Round Rock Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 540 F. Supp. 2d 735, 744 n.4 (W.D. Tex. 2007).  
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discrimination discouraged 
The First Amendment guarantees certain free speech rights 
to adults, but do schoolchildren retain these rights while at 
school? The simple answer is yes. However, the Supreme Court 
has provided several restrictions on free speech in schools. 
a. Tinker and the protection of free speech in public schools.  
The first free speech case to provide clear direction on 
students’ rights in school was Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District.38 The Supreme Court 
ruled seven to two that the First Amendment freedom of 
speech protection applied to schoolchildren.39 The majority 
famously stated, “It can hardly be argued that either students 
or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”40 Protesting the 
then ongoing conflict in Vietnam, a group of adults and 
students decided to wear black armbands.41 The school 
responded to the plan and adopted a policy against wearing the 
armband.42 After the students wore the armbands anyway and 
were suspended for violation of the policy, the students filed 
suit.43 
The Court’s decision marked a new standard for student 
speech at school.44 The Court protected student speech that did 
not “materially and substantially interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school.”45 The Court was, however, sensitive to the fact that 
schools are not a typical public forum for speech and that 
normal free speech standards do not always apply within 
schools as they do elsewhere.46 
Several cases that followed Tinker established various 
restrictions on free speech in schools.47 These include: Bethel 
 
 38 393 U.S. 503 (1969).   
 39 Id.  
 40 Id. at 506. 
 41 Id. at 504.  
 42 Id.  
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. at 503.  
 45 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).  
 46 Id. at 506–07, 509; see also Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School 
Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 663 (2009).  
 47 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (establishing that the 
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School District No. 403 v. Fraser,48 Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier,49 and Morse v. Frederick.50 
b. Free speech protected again under Rosenberger despite 
religious content.  
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Rosenberger v. Rector 
& Visitors of the University of Virginia.51 The case came to the 
Court as an Establishment Clause case but left as a free speech 
case.52 A University of Virginia student decided to produce a 
publication through his organization, Wide Awake Productions 
(“WAP”).53 The organization qualified as a Contracted 
Independent Organization (“CIO”) at the school and therefore 
was eligible to submit funding requests for a student 
publication.54 The Student Activities Fund (“SAF”) denied 
WAP’s request for funding and the University denied further 
recourse.55 The SAF claimed that the publication was 
considered “religious activity” and, therefore, was ineligible for 
publication funding.56 
In the judicial proceedings that followed, both the district 
court and the court of appeals found that the University had a 
compelling interest in maintaining separation of church and 
state and, therefore, upheld the University’s decision.57 
However, the Supreme Court found that the Establishment 
Clause concerns were not sufficient in this case to justify the 
 
school could limit lewd or profane language at school-sponsored activities); Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (providing additional restraints on 
printed material that bore the school’s name and endorsement); Morse v. Frederick, 
551 U.S. 393 (2007) (establishing additional limits on drug promotion and endorsement 
in school speech). 
 48 Bethel, 478 U.S. at 678 (concluding that the school should balance a student’s 
right “to advocate unpopular and controversial views in school” and the school’s 
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”). 
 49 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260 (reversing and drawing a line between the 
school’s toleration of speech and the promotion of speech.). 
 50 Morse, 551 U.S. at 393 (finding that the speech was not protected under the 
First Amendment because of the unique problems schools face in combatting drug use. 
Though Morse restricted student speech, the majority made a point to emphasize that 
students’ right to free speech in schools under Tinker remains mostly intact.).  
 51 515 U.S. 819 (1995).  
 52 Id.  
 53 Id. at 825.  
 54 Id. at 826–27.  
 55 Id. at 827.  
 56 Id.  
 57 Id. at 827–28.  
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SAF’s viewpoint discrimination against the petitioner’s 
publication.58 The court observed that the distinction between 
content discrimination (permissible) and viewpoint 
discrimination (impermissible) “is not a precise one.”59 The 
Court continued, “[T]o cast disapproval on particular 
viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free speech 
and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s 
intellectual life.”60 The Court made the point that a “sweeping 
restriction on student thought” would go beyond the 
University’s ability to effectually regulate which students the 
School would fund for publication.61 
As a result, the Court held that the school’s limit on the 
student’s speech was impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 
The majority stated that “[w]hen the government targets not 
subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a 
subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more 
blatant.”62 
2. The Establishment Clause in schools 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in this section show a 
pattern of protecting students’ speech when the appropriate 
forum exists and when the school has successfully separated 
itself from the speech. 
a. Mergens and the Equal Access Act.  
The Supreme Court heard a constitutional challenge to the 
Equal Access Act (“EAA”) in 1990 in Board of Education v. 
Mergens.63 Bridget Mergens attempted to establish a Christian 
club at her high school, but her request was denied because—
as the school claimed—such an organization would violate the 
Establishment Clause.64 Later, after the suit was filed in 
district court, Mergens argued that the refusal to allow the club 
violated the EAA.65 Under the EAA, a school that receives 
 
 58 Id. at 835, 839. 
 59 Id. at 831.  
 60 Id. at 836.  
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. at 829.  
 63 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
 64 Id. at 233. 
 65 Id. 
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federal aid and “maintain[s] a limited open forum” would be 
subject to the EAA.66 The school argued that it was not 
operating a limited public forum since it only allowed 
“curriculum-related” clubs to organize.67 Since this term is 
fairly ambiguous, the Court sought to provide further 
clarification.68 As a result, the Court determined that 
“curriculum-related” clubs are “any student group that . . . 
relate[s] to the body of courses offered by the school.”69 
Since the school allowed clubs that did not fall under this 
definition, the school had established a limited public forum for 
student clubs.70 The Court also rejected the notion that 
allowing the club would violate the Establishment Clause and 
argued that the EAA has the secular purpose of preventing 
discrimination against religious and other types of 
speech.71Justice O’Connor relied on the Court’s decision in 
Widmar v. Vincent, stating, “an open-forum policy including 
nondiscrimination against religious speech would have a 
secular purpose and would in fact avoid entanglement with 
religion.”72 
b. The lack of a limited public forum in Lee and Santa Fe and 
the students’ loss of protection.  
The Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman found that this 
particular school’s policy and practice regarding prayer at 
graduation violated the Establishment Clause.73 The 1992 case 
involved a school policy that allowed the school administration 
to dictate who gave the prayers and what language the prayers 
would include. The Court found that the policy violated the 
Establishment Clause because the government was coercing 
individuals “to support or participate in religion or its exercise, 
or otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or 
 
 66 Id.  
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 238. 
 69 Id. at 239.  
 70 Id. at 247.  
 71 Id. at 248.  
 72 Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Justice O’Connor also said—speaking of secondary school students—
“[they] are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse 
or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.” Id. at 
250.  
 73 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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religious faith, or tends to do so.’”74 The Court felt that prayer 
at graduation was coercive because of the captive audience. 
The Court recognized the significance of the event and that 
many students, though not required, would feel obligated to 
attend the graduation ceremonies.75 The Court stated that the 
“prayers bore the imprint of the state and thus put school-age 
children who objected in an untenable position.”76 
Eight years after Lee, the Court ruled on Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe, another school prayer 
case.77 In this case, the school’s policy allowed students to vote 
on (1) whether there would be a prayer at football games and 
(2) who would give the prayers.78 The school administration 
assumed that—because it had turned the process over to the 
students—that it would avoid the problems raised in Lee. 
However, the Court recognized the “crucial difference between 
government speech endorsing religion, which the 
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing 
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses 
protect.”79 In this case, the state’s involvement in the creation 
and carrying out of the policy fell into the former category of 
government speech endorsing religion. 
The Court made it clear that the First Amendment did not 
ban all religious expression in public schools.80 In fact, the 
Court stated that “nothing in the Constitution .†.†. prohibits 
any public school student from voluntarily praying at any time 
before, during, or after the schoolday.”81 
c. How the limited public forum in Rosenberger avoided 
violating the Establishment Clause.  
A second aspect of the aforementioned Rosenberger case—
which revolved around whether there was viewpoint 
discrimination in denying a student, religiously affiliated 
 
 74 Id. at 587.  
 75 Id. at 586. The majority rejected the argument that the graduation was 
voluntary and said that the graduation ceremony was, “in a fair and real sense 
obligatory.” Id.  
 76 Id. at 590. 
 77 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 78 Lee, 505 U.S. at 590.  
 79 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 
(1990)). 
 80 Id. at 313. 
 81  Id.  
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publication funding—deals with the concept of a limited public 
forum. Even though the university had created a forum for 
such expression, it was concerned that printing religious 
content would violate the Establishment Clause.82 The majority 
in Rosenberger stated, “It does not violate the Establishment 
Clause for a public university to grant access to its facilities on 
a religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of student groups . . 
. .”83 Further, “[t]here is no difference in logic or principle, and 
no difference of constitutional significance, between a school 
using its funds to operate a facility to which students have 
access, and a school paying a third-party contractor to operate 
the facility on its behalf.”84 The Court acknowledged the 
university’s concern, but suggested that the university was 
sufficiently separated from the student publications to avoid 
any claims of endorsement.85 
Finally, the Court detailed the constitutional standard 
governing a school’s decision to grant or restrict access to a 
limited public forum.86 Whereas a school or other state entity 
may establish a forum where it may “preserve the property 
under its control for the use to which it is dedicated,”87 it cannot 
exclude speech where its distinction is not “reasonable in light 
of the purpose served by the forum,”88 nor may it discriminate 
against speech on the basis of its viewpoint.89 
 
 82 The Court stated, “Government neutrality is apparent in the State’s overall 
scheme in a further meaningful respect. The program (University) respects the critical 
difference ‘between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment 
Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free 
Exercise Clauses protect.’” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 
U.S. 819, 841 (1995) (quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250)). 
 83 Id. at 842.  
 84 Id. at 843.  
 85 Id. at 844 (“By paying outside printers, the University in fact attains a further 
degree of separation from the student publication, for it avoids the duties of 
supervision, escapes the costs of upkeep, repair, and replacement attributable to 
student use, and has a clear record of costs.”). The Court continued to point out that 
the money, therefore, was not attributable to tax payers but to the SAF, avoiding any 
direct financial support from the State. Id. 
 86 Id. at 829. 
 87 Id. (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch., 508 U.S. 384, 
390 (1993)).  
 88 Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
804–06 (1985)).  
 89 Id. (quoting Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392–93).  
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d. Good News Club and the protection of free speech and equal 
access through a limited public forum.  
The Supreme Court ruled on Good News Club v. Milford 
Central School in 2001.90 This case revolved around the use of 
school property for a club meeting where religious activities 
took place. The school district restricted the use of the school 
property “by any individual or organization for religious 
purposes.”91 The main question before the Court was whether 
the limited public forum that was established should allow 
religious content.92 The School’s policy allowed groups to use 
the facilities as long as the events related to the “welfare of the 
community” and contributed to the “development of character 
and morals from a religious perspective.”93 However, the school 
did not allow groups to give “religious instruction” or engage in 
activities that were “religious in nature.”94 The Court found, as 
it did in Rosenberger, that this was impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination.95 
III.  ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACTS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT THE 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN SCHOOLS 
A. Recent Disturbing Patterns of Viewpoint Discrimination in 
Schools 
Students’ right to free speech—particularly religious 
speech—is under attack and the need for stronger policies 
protecting students has never been greater. The following are 
real examples from across the country where students’ free 
speech rights were in danger of violation. 
In New York, an intermediary school “indefinitely 
suspended a student for wearing rosary beads for religious 
reasons in violation of a dress code. The student sued, and after 
the court issued an injunction, the case was settled, with the 
school clearing the student’s record and paying nearly $25,000 
 
 90 533 U.S. 98 (2001).  
 91 Id. at 103.  
 92 Id. at 108.  
 93 Id.   
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. at 109. The majority stated, “[I]t is not clear whether a State’s interest in 
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would justify viewpoint discrimination.” 
Id. at 113.  
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in damages, fees, and costs.”96 
Another example occurred in Hawaii where parents were 
invited “to include messages to their children in the yearbook 
but [the school] refused to include one parent’s encouraging 
Bible quote. The principal ultimately agreed to include the 
Bible quote in the yearbook.97 
A third example comes from Indiana where a principal did 
not allow a “student to pass out religious flyers to other 
students that contained . . . e-mail address[es] and website[s] 
where students could submit prayer requests, although other 
students had been allowed to pass out flyers with secular 
content. The superintendent ultimately granted approval for 
the student to pass out the religious flyers.”98 
These examples illustrate that schools—acting to ensure a 
separation of church and state is observed—have infringed the 
free speech rights of schoolchildren on countless occasions. The 
trend is likely to continue. Enactors of the Antidiscrimination 
Acts, like the RVAA, have sought to statutorily protect 
children’s rights to religious expression. While only four states 
have adopted this legislation, it is the Author’s hope that more 
states will enact similar protections in the near future. 
B. The Court Recognizes the Importance of Free Speech Rights 
for Students in Public Schools 
The freedom of speech is a fundamental right and should be 
protected in schools.99 As illustrated by Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on this matter, public school attendees share 
most of the same free speech rights that normal citizens enjoy, 
with only minor differences.100 However, since the current 
public school atmosphere has become hostile toward religious 
expressions, the Antidiscrimination Acts are critical to 
protecting these rights. 
 
 96 Jay Alan Sekulow, Religious Liberty and Expression Under Attack: Restoring 
America’s First Freedoms, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct. 1, 2012), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/religious-liberty-and-expression-
under-attack-restoring-americas-first-freedoms#_ftn36. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. 
 100 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. Justice Fortas argues, “It can hardly be argued that 
either teachers or students shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this 
Court for almost 50 years.” Id. at 506. 
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1. The importance of protecting student speech in general 
The Court’s decision in Tinker established broad speech 
rights for students not engaged in school-sponsored activities.101 
Though later cases have suggested some restrictions on student 
speech rights, the Court has consistently maintained and 
reaffirmed the fundamental free speech rights that students 
have while in school.102 The Court’s analysis in Tinker included 
two considerations. First, the Court noted that the speech did 
not disrupt normal school activities.103 Second, the Court was 
perturbed that the school sought to limit a particular message, 
in essence attempting to discriminate against a viewpoint.104 
These considerations show that the Court desired to protect 
free speech without unduly burdening the school in fulfilling its 
intended purpose of providing education. 
In later cases, the Court sought to emphasize these rights 
and suggested that “permissible restrictions on student speech 
are the exceptions, not the rule.”105 Indeed, the decision in 
Morse established a general balancing test between (1) the 
nature of the speech restriction, (2) the type of speech involved 
and (3) the strength of the asserted school interest.106 
Though the body of Supreme Court jurisprudence has made 
clear that the First Amendment protects religious speech, the 
use of such speech in schools—for some—remains an open 
question. While, unquestionably, schools must respect the 
Establishment Clause, they may not trample upon free speech. 
 
 101 Id. at 505.  
 102 Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685 (ruling that lewd or profane language was not 
protected by First Amendment); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (ruling that the school 
could restrict sensitive material in student publication); Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 
(holding that school could restrict speech that promoted drug use). 
 103 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09. The Court continued to say that the speech did 
not involve “disruptive action or even group demonstrations” but was only “a silent, 
passive expression of opinion” which was “akin to pure speech.” Id. at 508. 
 104 Id. at 510–11. “Thus, Tinker tailored its analysis and holding to the problem 
of viewpoint discrimination, saying that viewpoint restrictions on student speech are 
constitutionally permissible only when necessary to avoid a substantial interference 
with the operation of a school or when the speech would invade the rights of other 
students.” Cordes, supra note 46, at 663. 
 105 Cordes, supra note 46, at 674. See also Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“But I do not read the opinion to mean that there are necessarily any 
grounds for such regulation that are not already recognized in the holdings of this 
Court.”) (speaking of Tinker, Hazelwood, and Bethel). Justice Alito goes on to say that 
the majority does not provide any further justifications for speech restrictions in 
schools. Id. 
 106 Id. at 395. 
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Justice Kennedy, in Rosenberger, aptly stated, “More than once 
have we rejected the position that the Establishment Clause 
even justifies, much less requires, a refusal to extend free 
speech rights to religious speakers who participate in broad-
reaching government programs neutral in design.”107 Public 
schools are not exempt. The Court’s analysis in Tinker 
emphasizes the protection of speech, including religious speech, 
in schools. 
2. Establishing a limited public forum protects students’ free 
speech rights 
Particularly when students speak at school-sponsored 
events, a limited public forum would protect students’ free 
speech rights and would protect the administration against 
Establishment Clause violations. Such a forum would ensure 
that student speech at school-sponsored activities is considered 
private speech and not government speech.108 A limited public 
forum differs from a typical public forum in that the entity 
establishing the forum can control subject matter. Subject 
matter restrictions typically take the form of broad rules about 
what can be said but do not affect the speaker’s ability to 
express viewpoints. 
Viewpoint discrimination is never permissible in any forum, 
especially one that has been opened up for expression. In 
Rosenberger, the Court stated, 
In determining whether the State is acting to preserve the 
limits of the forum it has created so that the exclusion of a 
class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a distinction 
between . . . content discrimination, which may be permissible 
if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and . . . 
viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible 
when directed against speech . . . .109 
The Court has recognized only a few categorical restrictions 
on student speech at school-sponsored events, including using 
profane and crude speech or encouraging drug use.110 However, 
 
 107 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. 
 108 The Court stated, “We have held . . . that an individual’s contribution to a 
government-created forum was not government speech.” Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302 
(citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819). 
 109 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
 110 Bethel, 478 U.S. at 680. The Court determined that the school had a 
legitimate interest in regulating the speech since it was crude and graphic. Id. at 689; 
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the decisions in both Lee and Santa Fe demonstrate that 
students’ rights are not the only critical aspect to consider. In 
both of those cases the Court did not restrict students’ rights to 
free speech, but rather the policies that the school had 
established to govern the speech.111 And while the school may 
not endorse or entangle itself with religious activities at these 
sorts of events, students still retain free speech rights, 
including the right to religious expression, when they speak at 
such an event.112 
The Rosenberger Court differed because the University’s 
policy was directly in line with the Constitution. The majority 
stated, “The University has taken pains to disassociate itself 
from the private speech involved in this case.”113 Furthermore, 
it argued that a limited public forum must protect viewpoint 
expressions once a forum has been established.114 While 
viewpoint cannot be restrained once a forum has been 
established, subject matter may be regulated.115 Viewpoints are 
typically considered “[the] substantive content or the message . 
. . convey[ed].”116 The Court’s analysis, though directed at a 
university, is applicable to high schools and potentially 
elementary schools since these too are organizations sponsored 
or run by the government, in addition to being places of 
learning and development.117 In Rosenberger, the Court 
protected speech in a metaphysical forum where the school 
funded printing costs.118 The Court looked at any involvement 
 
see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 577. 
 111 Lee, 505 U.S. at 577; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302. 
 112 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
 113 Id. at 841. 
 114 Id. at 839.  
 115 Id. at 828–29.   
 116 Id. at 828; see also Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosly, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).  
 117 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836. The Court says, speaking of universities, “to 
cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free 
speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life . 
. . .” See, e.g., Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias, and Viewpoint Discrimination in 
Public Schools, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 647, 655 (2005) (arguing that “students will try to 
assert their developing religious and political identity by a variety of methods, many of 
which we call speech.”) The author continues, “if schools silence such self-assertion 
without good reason . . . [then] Tinker [and arguably Rosenberger] can . . . be viewed as 
protecting a student’s right to push back . . . for the purpose of maintaining or 
developing identity free from state interference.” Id. 
 118 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. Again, another logical extension of the Court’s 
analysis here is beneficial. While the Court is deciding the case based on a 
“metaphysical” forum, the forum analysis applies just as aptly to schools. Id.   
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the school may have with the publications that it provided 
funds to and determined that there was no evidence to suggest 
that the school endorsed the publications.119 
C. Antidiscrimination Acts Protect Students’ Free Speech 
Rights 
The Antidiscrimination Acts encourage schools to adopt a 
policy that would protect basic free speech rights. 
Discrimination against free speech is unlikely a result of 
bigotry or hate, but rather it arises as a result of teachers’ and 
administrators’ lack of knowledge and expertise regarding 
First Amendment rights. The Acts seek to provide that 
knowledge to teachers and administrators. 
1. The right to voluntary religious expressions in general and 
in classwork or homework 
Students have the general right to freely express their 
views while at school.120 The Antidiscrimination Acts state that 
“a school district shall treat a student’s voluntary expression of 
a religious viewpoint . . . in the same manner the district treats 
a student’s voluntary expression of a secular or other viewpoint 
on an otherwise permissible subject.”121 
Students also have the right to express themselves in a 
similar manner in all classwork and homework assignments. 
The Acts state that students may express their written beliefs 
about religion in homework, artwork, and other written and 
oral assignments free from discrimination based on the 
religious content of the student’s submissions.122 Teachers and 
administrators have the right to judge a student’s work under 
“ordinary academic standards.”123 
2. The right to organize religious groups and to receive equal 
access 
Students also have the right to organize religious groups 
and to meet on school property to the same extent other non-
 
 119 Id. at 841–45. 
 120 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
 121 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.151 (2013).  
 122 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1804 (2014). 
 123 Id. 
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academic groups organize and meet.124 After the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Widmar v. Vincent, Congress passed the 
Equal Access Act in 1984.125 In essence the Equal Access Act 
and the Antidiscrimination Acts accomplish a similar goal: 
preventing discrimination based on religious content. The Acts 
state that “students may organize religious student groups, 
religious clubs, ‘see you at the pole’ gatherings, or other 
religious gatherings before, during, and after school to the 
same extent that students are permitted to organize other 
noncurricular student activities and groups.”126 
3. The acts’ policy of establishing limited public forums for 
school events will foster students’ free expression and protect the 
school 
The Antidiscrimination Acts suggest the establishment of a 
limited public forum for school-sponsored activities, which, in 
turn, protects both students’ free speech rights and the 
administration from Establishment Clause violations. The Acts 
also encourage a forum “that does not discriminate against a 
student’s voluntary expression of a religious viewpoint on an 
otherwise permissible subject.”127 Further, the Acts encourage 
the school to establish subject matter restrictions in the forum 
against any “obscene, vulgar, offensively lewd, or indecent 
speech.”128 
The school may require that the speech relate to the event 
for which they are speaking. For example, school 
administrators may ask graduation speakers to limit their 
speech to graduation-related subject matter. If the event is a 
pep-rally, the school may wish that the student speakers 
restrict their remarks to those subjects related to winning, 
school spirit, sports, etc. 
The Antidiscrimination Acts provide a framework for a 
limited public forum similar to the one approved by the Court 
in Rosenberger, wherein student speech is protected and the 
 
 124 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235 (holding that the Equal Access Act is constitutional 
and does not violate the Establishment Clause).  
 125 Symposium, supra note 35, at 970.  
 126 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1805 (2014). 
 127 MISS. ANN. CODE § 37-12-9(1)(a) (2014).  
 128 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.152(a)(3) (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-1-441(B) (2013); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-12-9(1)(c) (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1803(b)(3) (2014). 
Tennessee’s Act includes “promotes illegal drug use” in the list of restricted speech.  
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school is not considered to be endorsing the speech. To help 
disassociate student speech from the school, the Acts suggest 
that schools “[s]tate, in writing or orally, or both, that the 
student’s speech does not reflect the endorsement, sponsorship, 
position, or expression of the [school].”129 Additionally, two of 
the Acts provide a model policy that schools can reference when 
establishing their own policy.130 
All high schools currently have student speakers for 
graduation and in many cases for other school-sponsored 
events. When the school allows the students to speak, the 
school is understandably concerned about violating the 
Establishment Clause. However, “[m]ore than once [the 
Supreme Court has] rejected the position that the 
Establishment Clause even justifies, much less requires, a 
refusal to extend free speech rights to religious speakers who 
participate in broad-reaching government programs neutral in 
design.”131 The Antidiscrimination Acts will provide policy and 
practices that protect the First Amendment rights of students 
whilst simultaneously protecting schools from any claims 
that—by allowing such speech—its has violated the 
Establishment Clause. 
IV.  ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACTS DO NOT VIOLATE THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The Antidiscrimination Acts protect free speech without 
drastically increasing the chances of Establishment Clause 
violations. The Supreme Court has determined that there are 
several ways to violate the Establishment Clause. Most of 
these are listed below along with explanations on how the Acts 
do not violate this constitutional provision. 
A. Antidiscrimination Acts Pass the Lemon Test 
In the 1971 Lemon v. Kurtzman case, the Supreme Court 
struck, as unconstitutional, two state statutes, which provided 
supplemental funding to teachers at church-related educational 
institutions.132 The Court applied what is now known as the 
 
 129 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1803(b)(4) (2014).  
 130 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.156 (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-12-9(5) (2013).  
 131 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839. 
 132 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971).  
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Lemon test, which provides that to pass constitutional muster a 
statute must (1) have a secular legislative purpose; (2) be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) does not 
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.133 
The Court found both that the legislature had a secular 
purpose when it passed the statute and that the statute’s 
principal effect neither advanced nor inhibited religion, but 
found that the statute raised Establishment Clause concerns as 
to the third prong: government entanglement.134 While the 
Court acknowledged that complete separation between church 
and state is not absolute, it determined the entanglement was 
excessive after examining the (1) character and purposes of the 
institutions that it benefitted, (2) the nature of the aid that the 
State provided, and (3) the resulting relationship between the 
government and the religious authority.135 
1. Protection of free speech is a secular purpose 
The Antidiscrimination Acts protect student free speech, 
which is a secular purpose under the Lemon test.136 While the 
Acts reach beyond religious speech, they do specifically provide 
for the protection of the same.137 Critics of the Acts have argued 
that, because the legislation is deliberately aimed at protecting 
religious speech, the Acts could be invalidated under the 
Establishment Clause.138 Indeed, at least one opponent of the 
Acts has suggested that the Acts could be ruled 
unconstitutional under the Lemon test’s purpose prong,139 
especially given the fact that certain legislators that passed the 
Texas and Tennessee Acts expressed their interests in 
protecting religious speech. This, the critic argues, supports the 
notion that the Acts have a religiously motivated purpose. 
However, as mentioned in Board of Education v. Mergens, a 
subjectively religious motivation on the part of the legislature 
 
 133 Id. at 612–13.  
 134 Id. at 614–15. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 663.  “Our cases also recognize that legislation having a secular purpose 
and extending governmental assistance to sectarian schools in the performance of their 
secular functions does not constitute “law[s] respecting an establishment of religion” 
forbidden by the First Amendment merely because a secular program may incidentally 
benefit a church in fulfilling its religious mission.” Id. 
 137 See supra note 18.  
 138 Symposium, supra note 35, at 977–78.  
 139 Id. at 1018.  
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“alone would not invalidate [a statute], because what is 
relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the 
possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the 
law.”140 Thus, the critic only hints at the idea that the Acts 
would be unconstitutional because, the fact is, the protection of 
religious speech is a secular purpose.141 
2. The acts neither inhibit nor advance religion in schools but 
simply protect free speech 
Instead of seeking to advance or inhibit religion, the 
Antidiscrimination Acts pass the second prong of Lemon 
because they protect the accommodation of religion.142 In Cutter 
v. Wilkinson, speaking about the relationship between the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the Supreme Court found 
that “there is room for play in the joints between the 
Clauses.”143 Justice Thomas argued that under both the first 
and the second prong of Lemon, “[a] discredited test,” “any 
accommodation of religion – might well violate the 
[Establishment] Clause.”144 Clearly the Antidiscrimination Acts 
would not fail both the first and second prongs of the Lemon 
test simply because they protect a religious policy, an 
important point in Cutter.145 
3. Protection of free speech reduces government entanglement 
with religious speakers 
Finally, the Antidiscrimination Acts do not bring about any 
serious entanglement issues with the state. The third prong of 
the Lemon test requires more in-depth analysis because it 
deals with the actual implementation of the Acts.146 In Agostini 
v. Felton, the Court stated, “[n]ot all entanglements . . . have 
 
 140 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249. 
 141 Symposium, supra note 35, at 1019; see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 
709, 731 (2005) (arguing that the Establishment Clause does not mandate complete 
legislative avoidance of religion but merely prohibits Congress from making laws 
establishing religion); see also Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250.  
 142 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).  
 143 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719. Justice Ginsburg continues, “Our decisions recognize 
that ‘there is room for play in the joints’ between the Clauses, some space for legislative 
action neither compelled by the free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the 
Establishment Clause.” Id.  
 144 Id. at 726 n.1.  
 145 Id. at 709.  
 146 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.  
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the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Interaction 
between church and state is inevitable . . . [and] must be 
‘excessive’ before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause.”147 
The Court in Lemon found that the statutes in question 
involved excessive entanglement and as a result would violate 
the Establishment Clause.148 Also, in Agostini the Court found 
that the “pervasive monitoring by public authorities” of the 
activities of religious organizations caused excessive 
entanglement.149 The Antidiscrimination Acts will not require 
any pervasive monitoring by the state beyond the normal 
interactions that happen in public schools currently.150 The Acts 
will simply codify existing First Amendment rights.151 
Additionally, in Lemon, the Court compared the present 
case to previous cases where the state provided “secular, 
neutral, nonideological services, facilities, or materials.”152 The 
Court had no problem with the state providing these materials 
because the “potential for involving some aspect of faith or 
morals in secular subjects, a textbook’s content is 
ascertainable, but a teacher’s handling of a subject is not.”153  
Therefore, when compared to the materials, funding a teacher 
would cause the state to face a significantly greater risk.  
Teachers, however, can be regulated through workplace rules 
or regulations. Though schoolchildren may pose additional 
risks, schoolchildren are drastically different because they are 
not state employees or state funded. While a child’s “handling 
of a subject” (i.e., speaking at a school-sponsored event) may 
also be indeterminable, the Acts do not fund student speech 
and as a result do not require the state to pervasively monitor 
the speech.154 
B. Creation of Limited Public Fora in Which Religious Speech 
May Occur Is Consistent with the Establishment Clause 
Establishing a limited public forum at all school-sponsored 
events where students speak will help avoid Establishment 
 
 147 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).  
 148 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.  
 149 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233.  
 150 See supra note 18.  
 151 Id.  
 152 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616.  
 153 Id. at 617.  
 154 Id.; see also supra note 18.  
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Clause violations and—equally as important—will protect free 
speech rights. Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe v. Doe, two 
important Supreme Court cases, are prime examples of school-
led prayers, where a limited public forum may have been 
beneficial.155 
In Weisman, the school traditionally had a policy that 
allowed the school to invite ministers of various sects to pray at 
the school’s graduation ceremony.156 The Court questioned 
whether that policy violated the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.157 The Court 
concluded, “[t]hese dominant facts mark and control the 
confines of our decision: State officials direct the performance 
of a formal religious exercise at promotional and graduation 
ceremonies for secondary schools.”158 Additionally, the Court 
addressed the concern that attending the graduation ceremony 
became “participation in a state-sponsored religious activity” 
that felt “in a fair and real sense obligatory.”159 
In Santa Fe, the Court was presented with a similar 
concern at a different venue, a high school football game.160 As 
in Weisman, Santa Fe was a fact-intensive case where the 
school administration had established prayer policies.161 In 
Santa Fe, the school attempted to make the speech attributable 
to students by establishing an election process.162 However, the 
Court found that, as in Weisman, the school’s involvement in 
the prayer created the Establishment Clause concern.163 
The Antidiscrimination Acts escape the first problem of 
school-directed prayer with ease.164 They suggest the use of a 
limited public forum and require the student speaker to either 
orally or in writing waive the school of liability for involvement 
in the speech.165 The Acts would protect prayer-like speech in 
the context of a graduation ceremony where a student chose to 
 
 155 Lee, 505 U.S. at 577; see also Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 290.  
 156 Id. at 580. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 586. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 90.  
 161 Id. at 296–99. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 301. 
 164 Symposium, supra note 35, at 999; See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.152 (2013).  
 165 Id. 
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express religious speech within the bounds of the forum.166 In 
the end, the graduation attendees in Weisman and those 
attending a school in a state with these Antidiscrimination 
Acts may hear similar speech; the crucial difference is the lack 
of endorsement and state involvement.167 
1. A limited public forum for individual student speech does 
not endorse religion 
While opponents of the Antidiscrimination Acts argue that 
this type of legislation would deteriorate the Establishment 
Clause and ultimately cause discrimination, the 
Antidiscrimination Acts protect against discrimination and 
help prevent Establishment Clause violations.168 The 
endorsement test, originally used in Lynch v. Donnelly, asked 
whether a reasonable observer would find that the state’s 
purpose or effect was to endorse or inhibit religion.169 The 
endorsement test largely centers around two principles from 
the Lemon test, the purpose and effect prongs.170 The Lynch 
Court did not find endorsement of religion because the purpose 
and effect of including a Nativity scene in an annual Christmas 
display were both secular.171 
Similarly, in schools, the Antidiscrimination Acts do not 
endorse or inhibit religion. The purpose and effect are both 
secular. The Court in Lynch made it clear that “[t]he effect 
prong asks whether, irrespective of the state’s actual purpose, 
the practice under review in fact conveys a message of 
endorsement or disapproval.”172 While the Antidiscrimination 
Acts may protect religious speech, they do not convey a 
message of endorsement. The Acts clearly state that any 
religious speech should be treated “in the same manner in 
which the [school] treats a student’s voluntary expression of a 
secular or other viewpoint on an otherwise permissible subject . 
 
 166 Id. 
 167 Lee, 505 U.S. at 609; see also Symposium, supra note 35, at 999.  
 168 Symposium, supra note 35, at 978; See also, letter from ACLU to TN Governor 
Bill Haslam available at http://www.aclu-tn.org/pdfs/ACLU-TN%20RVAA%20Veto%20 
Letter.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
 169 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).  
 170 Id. at 690–92. 
 171 Id. at 685, 694. 
 172 Id. at 690. 
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2. A limited public forum protects student speech and does not 
coerce participation in school-sponsored speech 
While students are not forced to attend all school events 
such as graduation, pep rallies, and sporting events, the 
Supreme Court has expressed concern that students will feel 
obligated or pressured to attend to the point where the event is 
considered mandatory.174 The limited public forum, suggested 
by the Antidiscrimination Acts, addresses this concern.175 As 
discussed above, once the state has established a forum for 
student speech, the state cannot discriminate against a 
viewpoint expression.176 
The coercion problem, addressed in Lee v. Weisman, 
involved a school that was organizing prayer at graduation 
ceremonies. The school officials were the catalysts for the 
prayer. The Court made it clear, that “[s]tate’s involvement in 
the school prayers . . . violates these central principles” of the 
Establishment Clause.177 Removing the school’s hand in the 
speech would also remove any problems with coercion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the seven years since the Antidiscrimination Act was 
first passed in Texas, at least five other states have considered 
similar legislation and three others have enacted their own 
versions of the Act. The antagonistic attitude toward religious 
free speech in public schools has not improved since 2007. This 
Comment has shown that school districts can adopt and 
implement the Antidiscrimination Acts without violating the 
central tenants of the Establishment Clause. 
The Acts successfully protect student speech in (1) in-class 
voluntary expressions, (2) expressions in homework/school 
 
 173 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1802 (2014).  
 174 The Court pointed out that even though most students have the choice to 
attend the football game, others are required, such as the band, cheerleaders, and the 
athletes. Lee, 505 U.S. at 594–95; see also Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311–12.  
 175 See supra note 18. 
 176 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.  
 177 The state’s participation in the planning of the prayer was at the heart of the 
decision to remove the prayer. Nothing in this decision suggests that students in a 
limited public forum could not express their religious viewpoints. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
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assignments, (3) and group speech settings through the 
establishment of a limited public forum (which provides 
protection for both the school and the student). By establishing 
a limited public forum, not only will students’ rights be 
protected, but also schools can avoid the pitfalls of an 
Establishment Clause violation if and when a student shares a 
religious viewpoint. 
The Acts effectively address real areas of concern for 
students and schools. Students that are discriminated against 
or simply restricted from sharing views because of their 
religious content have recourse in the First Amendment. 
Unfortunately, those students may not be afforded the 
protection they deserve. The Acts, with accompanying policies, 
if enacted in more states and adopted by schools, will protect 
students and schools in preventing burdensome litigation, 
prohibiting unwarranted discrimination, and, most 
importantly, ensuring that the First Amendment rights of 
students are guaranteed. Adopting legislation that 
accomplishes these aims is simply commonsense. 




 * The author is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of Mississippi School of Law 
and an Executive Articles Editor and Technical Editor of Volume 85 of the Mississippi 
Law Journal. He received his Bachelors of Arts degree in Philosophy, with a minor in 
Political Science from Brigham Young University. The author wishes to thank 
Professors Jack Nowlin and Lisa Roy for their continuous direction and support, his 
peers in Academic Legal Writing, and most importantly his wife, Chelsea. 
